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Abstract The article challenges both cognitive-universalist and unnatural-exceptionalist 
approaches to fictional minds by analyzing how the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
novel merges the premodern poetics of exemplarity with emergent modern techniques of 
representing consciousness. It focuses on the “immature” forms of free indirect discourse in 
Madame de Lafayette’s Princesse de Clèves (1678) while also briefly digressing to some 
relevant European novels in the eighteenth-century sentimental tradition. In these novels the 
negotiation between the socially shared and the imaginatively constructed is tangibly 
inscribed in the narrative discourse. The article argues, first, that the heterodiegetic narrator’s 
epistemic and psychological authority is narratively located not far from the gossip and social 
scheming (“naturally occurring storytelling”) within the story world. Second, rather than 
outrightly replacing the representation of exemplary minds and dispositions with an 
individualizing rendering of subjective consciousness, these novels transform the code of 
exemplum into an internalized strategy for the characters—and a case for self-reflection for 
the amateurish heterodiegetic narrators. The theoretical framework draws from Monika 
Fludernik’s (1993) pioneering cognitive-narratological theory of schematic speech and 
thought representation, suggesting that this linguistic theory should be modified to 
encompass a pertinent theme in the Western novelistic tradition. 
Keywords: exemplum, consciousness representation, diachronic narratology, schematic 
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Roland Barthes’s definition of écriture classique (classical writing) is inspiration for 
Jonathan Culler’s discussion of convention and naturalization in his Structuralist Poetics 
(1975). According to Barthes (1972: 42), the French novel from the seventeenth to the early 
nineteenth centuries was dominated by a peremptory referential logic. As an institutional 
practice, écriture was grounded on an understanding of a shared world model to which it 
could unambiguously refer. As Culler (1975: 134) sums up the rhetorical and stylistic 
manifestations of this referential concord, “Language need only gesture towards the world.” 
As an example, Culler (ibid.) takes up Madame de Lafayette’s story “La Comtesse de Tende” 
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(1664), in which the count, upon learning that his wife is pregnant with another man’s child, 
thinks “everything that it was natural to think in such circumstances” (Culler’s translation 
from the French). Here écriture takes for granted the contemporary audience’s shared 
understanding of a cuckolded husband’s experiential repertoire. Yet Culler’s discussion 
leaves out the illustrative context for this referential nod: “Agité et affligé, comme on peut se 
l’imaginer: il pensa d’abord tout ce qu’il était naturel de penser en cette occasion; il ne 
songea qu’à faire mourir sa femme” (Lafayette 1825 [1664]: 289).1 
In the courtly and sentimental novels of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, extreme 
emotions caused by love and jealousy are typically both exemplary and at the same time so 
unique and transgressive that they cannot be translated into language. A vague and yet 
apparently exhaustive reference to a schematic emotion can be accompanied by the 
heterodiegetic narrator’s commentary on the ultimate inexpressivity and unreadability of such 
extraordinary feelings. Peculiarly enough Culler’s example, displaying full confidence in 
referential conventions, is also preceded by a lamentation that seems to cancel the subsequent 
schematization of the cuckolded husband. Here we have a failed attempt to describe the 
husband’s immediate reaction to his wife’s confessional letter: “Mais que ne pensa-t-il point 
après l’avoir lue! S’il eût eu des témoins, le violent état où il étoit l’auroit fait croire privé de 
raison, ou prêt de perdre la vie. La jalousie et les soupçons bien fondés préparent d’ordinaire 
les maris à leurs malheurs; ils ont même toujours quelques doutes: mais ils n’ont pas cette 
certitude que donne l’aveu, qui est au-dessus de nos lumières” (ibid.: 288).2 As noted by 
several Lafayette scholars, in the early modern courtly life from which Lafayette draws her 
plots, personages, and other cultural codes, emotion was grounded on social maxims and was 
supposed to follow authoritative exempla (see, e.g., Lyons 1989: 217–36; Muratore 1994: 
94–95). Even rage and jealousy had legitimate models that were formed in, for example, 
letter writing, either fictional or nonfictional. The case of Gabriel Joseph de Lavergne de 
Guilleragues’s Lettres portugaises (1669) proves that fictionality made no difference in this 
respect. Even after being revealed as not written by “Sister Mariana” but by the Count de 
Guilleragues, the letters continued to be the ultimate model of expression for passionate love 
(Bray 2003: 29–32; Kauffman 1986: 92–98). If emotions were mere performatives that 
follow a coded logic of representation, one would expect them to have been easily 
communicable. However, as is already apparent in the passage cited from “La Comtesse de 
Tende,” the sentimental novel contains a countertradition to schematicity—the convention of 
the unprecedented and inexpressible experience. This conventional foregrounding of 
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unprecedented experience in “La Comtesse de Tende” does not, however, cancel out 
Barthes’s and Culler’s notions of écriture classique and its consensual reliance on 
unambiguous referentiality. Rather, it demonstrates how, paradoxically, even experiential 
idiosyncrasies can be harnessed to serve vraisemblance (probability) (see Culler 1975: 138–
60; Genette 1968). The sentimental hero’s or heroine’s extraordinary emotions are typical 
and recognizable (in Culler’s [1975: 137-8] terms, “naturalizable”) precisely because they 
have a “natural” place in the consensual, classical world order. 
How does this oscillation between exemplarity and uniqueness affect the relation 
between character experience and narratorial knowledge? Let us look again at the Lafayette 
example. Emblematic of early novelistic narration, the negotiation between the socially 
shared and the imaginatively constructed is tangibly inscribed in Lafayette’s narrative 
discourse. The count’s reaction is evoked through an interrogative interjection (“que ne 
pensa-t-il point!”) only to dissolve into a kind of sociopsychological speculation that anyone 
knowledgeable about the prevailing social maxims could indulge in. Lafayette’s 
heterodiegetic narrator, while pioneering in its psychological depth of vision and its ability to 
reinvent courtly chronicles as fictions, is still a draft. Its epistemic and psychological 
authority is narratively located not far from the gossip and social scheming (“naturally 
occurring storytelling,” Fludernik 1996: 10) within the story world. The above quoted 
example displays a recurring rhetorical figure in Lafayette’s prose—an attempt to imagine a 
character’s state of mind through sociocultural exempla and maxims followed by a 
construction of a hypothetical courtly focalizer, a witness position (témoin) from which to 
attribute a mental state to the character. Why this recourse to social mind attribution once the 
narration has already stepped into the realm of fictional invention? 
The late seventeenth century and the eighteenth century present narration that is in 
many senses a novel in progress, with its chronicler and witness narrators gradually 
transforming into novelistic authorities and inventors of verisimilar social realities and with 
its characters wavering between individual psychology and collective maxims. These novels 
balance between the premodern tradition of romance and the growing readerships’s lust for 
the private. At this moment in the history of the European novel, the so-called omniscient, 
heterodiegetic narrator takes its first fumbling steps and makes its first experiments with 
extensive representations of fictional minds.3 At the same time the juncture between “natural” 
social exchange and the specifically literary means for rendering private consciousness is at 
its most visible, and I would go as far as to claim that this joint is thematized in some of the 
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pioneering modern novels, as the literary mind-reading game is usually only a short step 
away from—or only on a slightly higher diegetic level than—the gossipy mind-reading 
games taking place in the storyworlds.  
In this essay I will show how this developmental stage of the novel, by exposing 
intriguing parallels and discrepancies between social, embodied (“natural”) intersubjectivity 
and literary (“unnatural”) modes, may affect our theoretical understanding of the nature of 
fictional minds. My specific theoretical goal is to demonstrate that attention to this technical 
“immaturity” manifested in the early sentimental and psychological novel opens new 
dimensions of the ongoing narratological debate between the proponents of unnatural 
narratology and those of cognitive narratology. The controversy is outlined by David Herman 
in his introduction to The Emergence of Mind (2011), where he criticizes the “exceptionality 
thesis,” by which he refers to the unnaturalizing approach to fictional minds represented by 
Dorrit Cohn, Brian Richardson, and others, including myself (Herman 2011: 11). 
Exceptionalists, for Herman, are narratologists on the lookout for specifically literary modes 
of consciousness representation and who, consequently, highlight the expressive and thematic 
potential of such features as the nonreferentiality of fiction and the epistemic accessibility of 
the fictional mind (Cohn), incommunicability (Henrik Skov Nielsen), textuality (Maria 
Mäkelä), and antimimetic elements of fiction (Richardson). Herman counters the 
exceptionality thesis from two directions, first by making an “accessibility argument” (ibid.: 
18) for the actual human mind, grounding it on the contemporary anti-Cartesian notion of the 
mind as “readable” from embodied interaction, and second, through his “mediation 
argument,” (ibid.) claiming that the cognitive repertoire with which we make sense of the 
workings of actual and fictional minds is universal. The context for Herman’s critique is a 
very comprehensive volume on the diachronic evolution of consciousness representation, 
which, for all the writers in the volume, is inseparable from the general cognitive and cultural 
changes in the human mind. Thus this field-shaping contribution to the diachronic study of 
fictional minds by the cognitive-narratological camp ranges pronouncedly against both 
unnatural narratology and the classical study of the linguistic modes of consciousness 
presentation of the Cohn type (critiqued by the cognitive narratologist Alan Palmer [2004: 
30–31] under the rubric of the “speech category approach”). 
Unimpeded by the cognitivist critique of discourse centeredness, I will mainly deal 
with the early, emergent forms of free indirect discourse in Lafayette’s Princesse de Clèves 
(2005 [1678]) with some digressions into exemplary European sentimental novels of the 
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eighteenth century to discuss the clash between the premodern poetics of exemplarity and 
modern consciousness representation. I argue that the seedbed for those novelistic 
conventions considered to provide a maximum amount of figural subjectivity and a 
maximum amount of novelistic invention is the schematization of consciousness. The 
embryonic free indirect discourse—still bearing traces of its early epistolary prototypes (see 
Bray 2003; Mäkelä 2011)—is the ultimate locus for schematized consciousness 
representation. Its alleged origin lies ambivalently between the not-yet-omniscient narrator, 
the character as an incomplete individual, and the almost all-knowing society—all in search 
of inimitability but finally driven to settle for schematicity. Rather than straightforwardly 
replacing the premodern representation of exemplary minds and dispositions with an 
individualizing rendering of subjective consciousness, these novels transform the code of 
exemplum into an internalized strategy for the characters—and a case for self-reflection on 
the part of the amateurish heterodiegetic narrators. 
With this reading I hope to challenge both cognitive-universalist and 
unnatural-exceptionalist approaches to novelistic consciousness representation as I seek to 
deconstruct the limit between social and novelistic imagination. In the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century novel, the emergent consciousness representation grounded on narratorial 
privilege materializes the process whereby “natural” enactment of fictional emotions gets 
“unnaturally” complicated in the novelistic process of verbalization and invention. For the 
purposes of textual analysis, I draw my theoretical framework from Monika Fludernik’s 
(1993) pioneering cognitive-narratological theory of schematic speech and thought 
representation, a contribution that merits more critical attention than it has hitherto received. 
According to Fludernik, the linguistic consequence of our prototype-oriented ways of sense 
making is that a reproduced speech or thought is not, by definition, faithful to the original 
utterance but is instead a schematized approximation (a “fiction,” as Fludernik ventures) 
drafted according to situational and narrative frames. In other words, when we want to evoke 
a discourse within discourse, we end up communicating utterances that would have been 
typical, likely, and plausible in the evoked discursive context. Fludernik does not look into 
the thematic potential of the schematized representation of another voice in fiction, which 
opens a critical gap that I have tried to fill in some of my previous studies (Mäkelä 2006, 
2011) and will target with this essay as well. 
As the primary test case, La Princesse de Clèves provides a refreshing 
recontextualization of “exceptionality” in contrast to the notion Herman advances in his 
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critique of classical and unnatural approaches to fictional minds. The novel’s narration, its 
plot, and the very personality of its heroine are all established as both exemplary and 
exceptional in the Western canon. As maintained throughout modern Lafayette scholarship 
and famously demonstrated by Gérard Genette (1968) in his essay on vraisemblance, La 
Princesse de Clèves is the indisputable point in the development of the early novel at which it 
turns away from the universal and toward the particular. This struggle finds its culmination in 
the princess’s extraordinary confession to her husband of her love for the Duc de Nemours 
and her final retreat to a monastery after her husband has died of jealousy, moral actions that 
the contemporaries of Lafayette condemned outright as invraisemblable (ibid.: 8). A 
canonical interpretation of the princess’s social nonconformity turns her moral actions into an 
allegory of emerging individuality and thus of the birth of individuated novelistic interiority 
(see, e.g. François 2008: 84–85). 
Consequently, my rationale for the selected examples is also a synthesis of 
exceptionality and exemplarity. I wish to respond to Fludernik’s (2003) call for a diachronic 
narratology, but instead of managing to offer an exhaustive account of the development of the 
fictional mind in the European novel, I choose to concentrate on what I believe narratology is 
in fact best suited to do—the analysis of exemplary passages of narrative discourse that can, 
in their language and structure, encapsulate diachronic change. I refer to this potential when 
characterizing especially La Princesse de Clèves—but also to some degree the emerging 
modern novel of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at large—as a work in progress. 
From the point of view of a twenty-first century reader, many narrative situations balancing 
between classicist regularity and romanticist irregularity of emotion (cf. François 2008: 85) 
exemplify the diachronic movement in their very synchronic form precisely because they are 
not completely at home in either of these traditions. Thus any straightforward account of 
linear, imminent evolution in literary forms will fail to do justice to this irresolvable tension 
between the schematicity and fidelity models at work in renderings and interpretations of 
fictional consciousness—all the more so, as much of the research I have done on 
consciousness representation points to the fluctuating presence of such a tension throughout 
the history of the novel (e.g., Mäkelä 2006, 2011). 
Another available literary-historical narrative besides the formalist-evolutionary 
trajectory is the reciprocity model adopted, for example, in Herman’s Emergence of Mind. 
This perspective views the history of the novel as an exchange between novelistic 
conventions and the culturally prevailing models of subjectivity. It seems evident to me that 
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precisely this contextualizing model is the truthful description of literary-historical change. It 
is, however, another thing to construct a model of historical causality that would authorize a 
method called “diachronic narratology.” Brian McHale’s (2012: 123) astute critique of The 
Emergence of Mind exposes the inherent methodological vicious circle in the reciprocal-
externalist approach to literary consciousness representation: “The evidence of historical 
changes in consciousness is being adduced from the very same textual sources that are then 
explained in terms of those historical changes.” In the following I will have some recourse to 
general notions of the social and cultural codes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
with regard to subjectivity and emotions, especially those of courtly life, but only as they are 
characterized in the literary-historical scholarship. My ultimate aim is to analyze the history 
of the novel in the light of the synchronicities of form. 
La Princesse de Clèves I: Ballroom Mind Attribution 
I like to envisage Robert Alter sharing my interest in emblematic textual occurrences of 
diachronic change when he suggests that the celebrated ball scene in La Princesse de Clèves 
marks the birth of modern novelistic techniques. The fateful scene, singled out by Alter and 
dozens of other scholars before and after him, presents the first meeting between the princess 
and Nemours, but it also marks the beginning of fictional invention, as thus far the narrative 
has mainly followed the referential conventions of a chronicle, relying on actual events and 
the personages of the sixteenth-century French court of Henry II. 
Le bal commença et, comme elle dansait avec M. de Guise, il se fit un assez grand 
bruit vers la porte de la salle, comme de quelqu’un qui entrait et à qui on faisait place. 
Mme de Clèves acheva de danser et, pendant qu’elle cherchait des yeux quelqu’un 
qu’elle avait dessein de prendre, le Roi lui cria de prendre celui qui arrivait. Elle se 
tourna et vit un homme qu’elle crut d’abord ne pouvoir être que M. de Nemours, qui 
passait par-dessus quelques sièges pour arriver où l’on dansait. Ce prince était fait 
d’une sorte qu’il était difficile de n’être pas surpris de le voir quand on ne l’avait 
jamais vu, surtout ce soir-là, où le soin qu’il avait pris de se parer augmentait encore 
l’air brillant qui était dans sa personne; mais il était difficile aussi de voir Mme de 
Clèves pour la première fois sans avoir un grand étonnement. (Lafayette 2005 [1678]: 
34; my emphasis)4 
As Alter (1989: 185–88) notes, from a literary-historical point of view, a striking 
change of mode takes place as the princess’s moment-to-moment perceptions become the 
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focus of narration. Up until now Lafayette’s narrator has restricted herself to the role of a 
courtly observer—a position that the actual author herself held at the court of the Sun King, 
Louis XIV. The scene emblematizes the beginning of the modern psychological novel for 
generations of scholarship because the only person to “be taken aback” is the princess, as 
everyone else in the ballroom is already acquainted with Nemours’s good looks. Thus the 
scene can be read as internally focalized, the perspectivization being signaled by a 
description of the princess’s sensory and epistemological stance: the noise at the door, 
“someone” coming, the delicious detail of Nemours bouncing athletically over the chairs, and 
the emotional shock that, in terms of early modern psychology, undoes rational judgment 
(see, e.g., McClure 2007). 
However, are we in fact moving from external to internal focalization? The narrator 
reports that “it was difficult not to be taken aback on seeing him when one had never seen 
him before,” which, in terms of courtly sentimental education, is an educated guess, since 
presumably everyone besides the princess is already familiar with Nemours’s looks. Is this 
point of view not simply a construction by the société (society), whose members are all 
anticipating this encounter between the two most attractive characters in the court, with the 
king actually staging the whole scene by making the couple dance together? In terms of 
contemporary narratology, the encounter is not only internally focalized, it actually embeds 
two levels of focalization. We get the court’s perception of Nemours’s and the princess’s 
perceptions of each other. Paradoxically, it is exactly this multilayered system of 
focalizations that naturalizes the narrative setup, since no omniscience and no invention is 
needed to attribute mental states to characters. The narrator could just as well be an observant 
member of the court, like the jealous Chevalier de Guise, registering the external signs of 
emotions—and even more importantly, constructing the psychology of the scene with the 
help of courtly romantic codes: 
Le chevalier de Guise, qui l’adorait toujours, était à ses pieds, et ce qui se venait de 
passer lui avait donné une douleur sensible. Il le prit comme un présage que la fortune 
destinait M. de Nemours à être amoureux de Mme de Clèves; et, soit qu’en effet il eût 
paru quelque trouble sur son visage, ou que la jalousie fît voir au chevalier de Guise 
au-delà de la vérité, il crut qu’elle avait été touchée de la vue de ce prince. (Lafayette 
2005 [1678]: 35)5 
Such evidence of naturally occurring courtly mind attribution behind a seemingly 
internalized novelistic scene could easily be used to argue against the exceptionality thesis. If 
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already the emergence of the psychological novel is firmly grounded on embodied 
intersubjectivity (“Whether her face had really betrayed”) and sociocultural scripts—such as 
the classical notion of desire, dictated by (public) myth rather than (private) individual 
psychology (“fate meant M. de Nemours to fall in love” [see Greenberg 1992: 24–26])—then 
why adhere to the modern “fidelity” model, which insists on privileged narratorial access to 
the private mind? Indeed, this reading lends support to both Herman’s accessibility argument 
and his mediation argument. The “courtly mind” appears just as readable in the diegetic story 
world as at the extradiegetic level of narration, and it makes sense to conclude that the 
members of the court, the chronicler narrator, and the implied contemporary (in all 
probability courtly) reader would share the frames and scripts with which to interpret the 
scene. Furthermore, if expressions of both real-life and literary experience lack origin and 
authenticity, both are formed by previous examples, and the available examples may just as 
well be fictional as real, then what is left to constitute the privileged domain of knowledge for 
the emergent omniscient narrator? From a premodern perspective, the scene between the 
princess and Nemours, in all its apparent extraordinariness, is but a rehearsal of a classical 
setup anticipated by the court. 
The fact that not only one’s conduct but also one’s experiential domain in the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century courtly life was dominated by exemplaires —and thus 
based on an imitation of superior examples—renders any classical narratological approach 
based on subjectivity markers insufficient. The inherent external-internal binary nature of 
classical narratological reasoning has been reworked not only by first- and second-wave 
cognitivists concentrating on the distributed and the embodied mind but also by 
“diachronists” who have been efficient in ferreting out extracanonical test cases from 
centuries ignored by previous narratological scholarship. The premodern evidence does not, 
however, seem to unconditionally support the enactivist paradigm and its ahistorical claim for 
cognitive universals (see, however, Fludernik 2014). Eva von Contzen (2015) challenges the 
universality of Palmer’s (2010) “social minds” theory by demonstrating how collectives in 
medieval texts form primarily functional, not “intermental,” units and how the exemplarity of 
a character translates into a shared experience among readers and not among the characters in 
the storyworld. A mere diachronic expansion of the corpus reveals the underlying (modernist) 
internalist logic of cognitive narratology’s seemingly externalist approach to narratives. 
Although Palmer concentrates on the externally “readable” signs of cognitive mental 
functioning, the ultimate object of knowledge is the modern mind within the text, not 
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collective subjectivity in action (von Contzen 2015).6 Much the same critique could be 
presented based on the evidence from the early modern novel, since neither in the courtly 
romance nor in the later forms of the sentimental novel does the private mind provide a 
genuine counterpoise to social life, as it later did in the bourgeois novel, in spite of the fact 
that in these novels a considerable amount of energy is invested in maintaining appearances 
and disguising one’s reactions. 
Von Contzen’s (ibid.: 149) juxtaposition of exemplarity with cognitivist mind attribution 
theories is also valuable in the context of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century novel: “The 
concept of exemplarity implies that a character who functions as a model is both very much 
alike the group or category to which she belongs and at the same time different because 
outstanding.” La Princess de Clèves is a genuine embodiment of this medieval category. The 
novel ends with the narrator stating that “her life”—meaning primarily the famously unlikely 
acts of confession and retreat—“left inimitable examples of virtue” (Lafayette 2008: 156). 
However, as duly noted in Lafayette scholarship (see, e.g., Brooks 1993: 31–32; Muratore 
1994: 99–101; Prince 1992: 49), the princess is ultimately capable of escaping exemplarity 
and becoming an individual—if not in her mentality then at least in her actions. She even 
shows self-awareness of her pioneering role. When discussing the rumors about her 
confession of her love for Nemours, her husband suggests that she may have mistaken some 
other virtuous woman for herself in some exemplary confessional story she had heard circling 
around the court. However, the princess replies: “Il n’y a pas dans le monde une autre 
aventure pareille à la mienne; il n’y a point une autre femme capable de la même chose. Le 
hasard ne peut l’avoir fait inventer; on ne l’a jamais imaginée et cette pensée n’est jamais 
tombée dans un autre esprit que le mien” (Lafayette 2005 [1678]: 135).7 The protagonist’s 
remark is ironically metafictional, because another effort to overcome preset psychological 
parameters takes place on the extradiegetic level of narration. The fact that the princess and 
her psychological profile are indeed the only products of pure invention and imagination in 
the novel makes her an exemplum of the narrative struggle to find a verbal expression for 
emerging modern individualism. I propose that this struggle between exemplarity and 
exceptionality—as well as between “natural” mind attribution and novelistic representation 
of consciousness—manifests itself at the level of narration as agential indecision. 
The first type of agential indecision relates to perception and is exemplified by the 
ballroom scene. Ambivalence in focalization is created both horizontally, between diegetic 
agents (who is focalizing when—the princess, Nemours, the court as a collective, Guise?), 
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and vertically, between the intradiegetic and the extradiegetic levels (courtly mind attribution 
vs. the privileged internal perspective of the omniscient narrator, an interpretation that Alter 
and many other scholars maintain). Von Contzen (2015: 149), in arguing that the reading of 
medieval texts is not about social minds, suggests that exemplarity relocates experience in the 
reading audience, since the hero’s singularity is interpreted as being representative. La 
Princesse de Clèves dramatizes the characterological, narratorial, and readerly ambivalence 
between medieval exemplarity and novelistic experientiality by mirroring readerly activities 
within the storyworld. In the ballroom scene the Chevalier de Guise occupies the place of the 
seventeenth-century courtly reader both by adhering to the socially shared, classical and 
mythical script of desire and by trying to read the singular workings of the princess’s mind. 
Another famous scene depicts Nemours spying on Mme de Clèves, while a nobleman 
recruited by M de Clèves is in turn stalking Nemours. This perspectival setup thematizes the 
similarities and differences of characterological and narratorial mind attribution. The 
privileged positions of the spies, with their nonreciprocal gazes, mimic the privileged 
positions of the novelistic narrator and her audience, while the narrator, again overwhelmed 
by the inexpressibility of Nemours’s sensations (“It is impossible to express what M. de 
Nemours felt at this moment” [Lafayette 2008: 128]), adheres to a schematization of his 
experience through linguistic impersonation (“To see a woman he adored in the middle of the 
night . . . to see her, without her knowing he was there” [ibid.]). The concluding remark about 
how unprecedented this experience is (“What lover has ever enjoyed or even imagined such 
delight?” [ibid.]) then reverts to the impossibility of verbalizing the experience. 
What no one has ever experienced or even imagined before cannot be expressed, 
because there is no ready emotional and expressive schema for it. Again, the heterodiegetic 
narrator is only a small step ahead of the epistemological stance of an intradiegetic agent (a 
spy or a témoin), albeit here the modern problem of the narrator knowing the thoughts of her 
character is much less pertinent than the problem of verbalization reflecting the early modern 
contradiction between exemplarity and exceptionality. Lafayette’s narrator is not withholding 
information on the character’s experience (in the sense originally theorized in Sternberg 
1978) but instead wavers between shared, classical codes of emotion and the new novelistic 
individuality. The narrator’s relation to her character’s interiority is more a matter of 
recognition and frame application than of faithful representation of a “knowable” content. 
On many occasions the story-internal “readers” of interiority in Lafayette’s narration 
remain hypothetical constructs, or a hypothetical perceiver is erected alongside an actual 
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focalizer, as when the princess learns from Mary Stuart, the unrivaled court gossip, that 
Nemours has rejected marital negotiations with the queen of England, Elizabeth I: 
Le moyen de ne se pas reconnaître pour cette personne dont on ne savait point le nom 
et le moyen de n’être pas pénétrée de reconnaissance et de tendresse, en apprenant, 
par une voie qui ne lui pouvait être suspecte, que ce prince, qui touchait déjà son 
cœur, cachait sa passion à tout le monde et négligeait pour l’amour d’elle les 
espérances d’une couronne? Aussi ne peut-on représenter ce qu’elle sentit, et le 
trouble qui s’éleva dans son âme. Si Mme la Dauphine l’eût regardée avec attention, 
elle eût aisément remarqué que les choses qu’elle venait de dire ne lui étaient pas 
indifférentes; mais, comme elle n’avait aucun soupçon de la vérité, elle continua de 
parler, sans y faire de réflexion. (Lafayette 2005 [1678]: 68)8 
The narrator, by convincing her audience that careful enough attention paid in the storyworld 
would have yielded similar knowledge about the princess’s emotions as she herself possesses, 
is simultaneously setting up and tearing down the epistemological barriers between the 
members of the court and herself as the privileged heterodiegetic narrator. Again, the 
hypothetical focal position within the storyworld functions as an intermediary between intra- 
and extradiegetic perception, suggesting that both are ultimately formed by the same framing 
cognitive and cultural schemata. As Daniel Hostert (2015: 175–76) notes in his reading of 
early modern English narratives, hypothetical focalization, as originally defined by Herman, 
may suggest a collective experience. As such, it is a narrative device that can, for example, 
relativize some knowledge about the storyworld without compromising the authority of the 
external narrator. Hostert’s “diachronized” interpretation of Herman’s theory is supported by 
evidence from La Princesse de Clèves. The hypothetical perceiver, someone capable of 
“regarder avec attention,” is indeed everyone and anyone in the storyworld, verifying those 
schematic sketches of the characters’ interiorities that nevertheless come into existence 
through privileged novelistic consciousness representation. All in all, the hypothesis of 
focalization in narrative constellations that would allow a personified, perceiving agent points 
toward the schematization of another person’s consciousness at work both in the court and in 
the emerging novelistic discourse. These imagined or actual story-internal perceivers smooth 
over the literary-historical transition from social to novelistic mind attribution, but at the 
same time they also increase perspectival ambivalence and hence contribute to an 
anachronistically modernist feel. 
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La Princesse de Clèves II: Schematic Free Indirect Discourse 
Although intersecting perceptions and suggestive appearances form the core action of the 
novel, the narrator’s most groundbreaking move away from social mind attribution toward 
novelistic invention concerns the verbalized consciousness, as it grows out of both the 
perspectival positioning of the narration with respect to the characters’ deictic coordinates 
and the characters’ keen surveillance of each others’ reactions within the storyworld. Thus 
the second type of agential indecision that I consider central to the celebrated “modernity” of 
La Princesse de Clèves finds its revolutionary expression in the undeveloped, roughly 
schematized free indirect discourse. A transition from a mere perspectivization to an 
imitation of inner discourse can already be perceived in the above quoted passage describing 
Mme de Clèves’s reaction to Mary Stuart’s gossip, albeit in a linguistic form that seems to 
suggest hypothesis: “Le moyen de ne se pas reconnaître” (“How could she not recognize 
herself”). The expression “Le moyen de” is an archaic version of the interjection 
“Comment!” or “Combien!” (“How [much]!”) that later became a conventional marker of 
free indirect discourse in French, yet here it still retains a sense of hesitancy, as if the narrator 
were rhetorically hypothesizing the exact amount and quality of the princess’s emotional 
tumult. At the same time the interjective expressivity of the description suggests the presence 
of a figural voice—though only in an anachronistically modern reading attuned to detecting 
subjectivity markers in novelistic discourse. The same literalized reading of the subjunctive 
interjection, combined with an impression of double voicedness, applies to the opening 
example from “La Comtesse de Tende,” where we find the narrator perplexed by the 
simultaneous schematicity and unimaginability of the cuckolded husband’s feelings: “Mais 
que ne pensa-t-il point après l’avoir lue!” 
When Lafayette’s narrator repeatedly declares of her personages that “no one has ever 
experienced such pain” or when she emphasizes the inexpressibility of their feelings, she is 
not merely exaggerating, because in terms of the history of the novel, the verbal and narrative 
form given to these sentiments is indeed unprecedented. Fludernik (1996: 153–59), when 
tracing the evolution of consciousness representation within the framework of natural 
narratology, singles out Aphra Behn—not Lafayette—as the pioneering figure, since Behn’s 
novelistic strategy was to internalize the dramatic monologue, a long-standing conventional 
technique for displaying a character’s hidden intentions onstage. Yet if we wish to trace 
emergent modern narrative modes that thematize their double origins in exemplarity and 
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exceptionality, Lafayette’s half-chronicler, half-inventor narrator figure and her half-
schematic, half-individual characters set an even better example than Behn. 
However, instead of adhering to the mainstream of free indirect discourse studies—a 
subdiscipline of narratology emphatically dominated by readings of the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century novel—we are better equipped to approach the undeveloped variants of 
free indirect discourse if we do so by way of Fludernik’s (1993) theory of schematic language 
representation. The latter appears in a massive, linguistically oriented study of free indirect 
discourse that predates her natural narratology, explaining how the constructivist logic of 
frame application in reading and the corresponding strategies of schematization and 
typification in texts build interpretations atop previous experience and knowledge. With 
regard to the novel of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one particularly interesting 
linguistic move in Fludernik’s theory is the renunciation of an “original utterance” of which a 
free indirect discourse rendering would be a stylized, double-voiced repetition (as maintained 
by many a canonical free indirect discourse study based on the “translatability” of speech 
categories from direct to free indirect and indirect [see, e.g., McHale 1978]). For Fludernik, 
free indirect discourse, both in fiction and in naturally occurring storytelling, is an ostensible 
reproduction of an utterance that has never existed. The representation of another’s speech in 
one’s own discourse is always an approximation that conforms to communicative 
expectations framed by prototypical discourse schemata, a fiction that produces a sense of 
expressivity and thus the presence of the other’s voice through a “linguistic hallucination” 
(Fludernik 1993: 453). 
Fludernik’s approach, emphasizing the lack of original verbalized interiority and 
treating the represented consciousness as an approximation built on narrative and discursive 
schemata, captures the essence of the early modern “mind” much more accurately than the 
internalizing and psychologizing “speech category approach.” Thus Fludernik’s linguistic 
theory ought to be reformulated to encompass a prominent theme in the history of the novel. 
Schematic language representation is not merely a structural reconstruction of the effect of 
language use but also a formal instantiation of a thematic problem, suggesting a particularly 
literary concept of subjectivity that rests on the tension between uniqueness and schematicity, 
between the particular and the universal. 
The most illuminating example of free indirect discourse growing out of “natural” 
hypotheses and sociocultural framing—as well as of the peculiarly self-reflexive stance 
Lafayette’s princess appears to be taking vis-à-vis her groundbreaking role as a novelistic 
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mind—is in Mme de Clèves’s reaction to a letter she mistakenly believes is addressed to 
Nemours.9 The letter, written by an unidentified lady, circulates around the court as the 
ultimate exemple inimitable (inimitable example) of passionate expressivity as textualized, 
much like the letter writing manuals popular at the time. 
Mme de Clèves lut cette lettre et la relut plusieurs fois, sans savoir néanmoins ce 
qu’elle avait lu. Elle voyait seulement que M. de Nemours ne l’aimait pas comme elle 
l’avait pensé, et qu’il en aimait d’autres qu’il trompait comme elle. Quelle vue et 
quelle connaissance pour une personne de son humeur, qui avait une passion 
violente, qui venait d’en donner des marques à un homme qu’elle en jugeait indigne et 
à un autre qu’elle maltraitait pour l’amour de lui! Jamais affliction n’a été si piquante 
et si vive. . . . Enfin elle pensait tout ce qui pouvait augmenter son affliction et son 
désespoir. Quels retours ne fit-elle point sur elle-même! quelles réflexions sur les 
conseils que sa mère lui avait donnés! Combien se repentit-elle de ne s’être pas 
opiniâtrée à se séparer du commerce du monde. . . . Enfin, elle trouva que tous les 
maux qui lui pouvaient arriver, et toutes les extrémités où elle se pouvait porter, 
étaient moindres que d’avoir laissé voir à M. de Nemours qu’elle l’aimait et de 
connaître qu’il en aimait une autre. Tout ce qui la consolait était de penser au moins, 
qu’après cette connaissance, elle n’avait plus rien à craindre d’elle-même, et qu’elle 
serait entièrement guérie de l’inclination qu’elle avait pour ce prince. (Lafayette 2005 
[1678]: 90–91; my emphasis)10 
The English translation does not wholly capture the cumulative sense of urgency in 
the development of the princess’s unwarranted judgment. The interrogative-looking 
interjections (“Quelle vue et quelle connaissance,” “Quels retours,” “Combien se repentit-
elle”), already familiar from previous examples, can be interpreted as markers of typification 
and schematization (Fludernik 1993: 398–414). The summarizing “Enfin” is also a 
schematization marker, indicating that whatever extraordinary anguish the princess feels, it 
nevertheless rests on experiential schemata shared by the narrator and her audience. 
Paradoxically, the accumulation of expressivity in this passage lures the reader into reading 
the apparently objective declaration “Never has pain been so piercing and sharp” as a product 
of the heroine’s misguided mind, all the more so since it cancels out the previous 
schematization of the princess as “such and such a person,” thus creating sufficient ambiguity 
in the discourse to produce a double-voice effect. A figural reading finds its ultimate proof in 
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the closing sentence of this passage (“she would be wholly cured”), presenting Mme de 
Clèves’s fallacious, self-deceiving epiphany as a fact. 
Furthermore, an intriguing rhetorical complication is provided by the expressive 
discourse of the letter preceding the representation of the heroine’s emotional upheaval, for it 
appears as if the princess were appropriating the art of the letter writer to model her own 
interiority according to its normative aesthetic: 
Jamais douleur n’a été pareille à la mienne. Je croyais que vous aviez pour moi une 
passion violente; je ne vous cachais plus celle que j’avais pour vous et, dans le temps 
que je vous la laissais voir tout entière, j’appris que vous me trompiez, que vous en 
aimiez une autre et que, selon toutes les apparences, vous me sacrifiiez à cette 
nouvelle maîtresse. . . . Je crus que si quelque chose pouvait rallumer les sentiments 
que vous aviez eus pour moi, c’était de vous faire voir que les miens étaient changés; 
mais de vous le faire voir en feignant de vous le cacher, et comme si je n’eusse pas eu 
la force de vous l’avouer. Je m’arrêtai à cette résolution; mais qu’elle me fut difficile à 
prendre, et qu’en vous revoyant elle me parut impossible à exécuter! (Lafayette 2005 
[1678]: 88–89; my emphasis)11 
Not only the apparent situations of the two ladies learning about the liaisons of their loved 
ones but also the discourse reflecting these situations are parallel through and through. The 
exclamatory interrogatives and subjunctives (“comme si je n’eusse pas,” “qu’elle me fut 
difficile”), the accumulation of expressivity accompanied by a reference to “passion 
violente,” and most strikingly, the assertion “Jamais douleur n’a été pareille à la mienne” 
followed immediately by “Jamais affliction n’a été si piquante et si vive,” as if the two 
superlative expressions of pain neutralized each other and turned uniqueness into 
schematicity. This stylistic contagion gives rise to an interpretation of the princess as reliving 
the shame and the jealousy of the letter writer, which in turn makes the emergent free indirect 
discourse appear more like stylistic schematization than privileged narratorial access to the 
heroine’s private mind. Again, the boundary between the figural and the narratorial is blurred 
but in a way distinct from the stock functions of empathy and irony conventionally attributed 
to free indirect discourse. The juxtaposition of epistolary and heterodiegetic narration 
materializes the fact that not only the narrator but also the protagonist is using external 
models to create expressivity and experientiality. Thus it is somewhat surprising that 
Lafayette scholarship, while paying exhaustive attention to the functioning of embedded 
courtly romance narratives as exempla for the princess’s conduct and sentimental education, 
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remains reticent on this discursive mirror relation between the letter and the reaction (cf. 
Lyons 1989: 219–20; Campbell 1996: 158–9). 
Who is representing whose consciousness, then, if the expressive discourse has no 
psychological origin but is based on imitation and approximation? A brief look at some 
eighteenth-century classics narrated by self-reflexive character narrators attests to the fact 
that the schematization and typification of one’s own interiority was a recurrent strategy for 
coming to terms with otherwise “inexpressible” experiences and emotions. Samuel 
Richardson’s (2001 [1740]: 83) Pamela in Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded—famous for her 
artfulness in being able to craft, through letter writing, a narrative that turns her captivity into 
a prosperous marriage—is an example of how the apparently immediate rendering of 
consciousness in the poetics of the eighteenth-century novel is still prone to schematization: 
“The unparalleled wickedness, stratagems, and devices, of those who call themselves 
gentlemen, yet pervert the designs of Providence in giving them ample means to do good, to 
their own everlasting perdition, and the ruin of poor oppressed innocence!” 
Pamela’s writing is fraught with conventional expressivity markers, but instead of enhancing 
a sense of immediacy, they rather promote the exemplarity of her experience as the ultimate 
trial of “poor oppressed innocence.” While the early modern heterodiegetic narrator hardly 
has any epistemological privileges over her characters, the epistolary homodiegetic mode in 
turn flaunts authorial insight as the character narrator verbally crafts her own interiority. The 
juxtaposition of letters with heterodiegetic narration and free indirect discourse, a recurring 
compositional motif in the novels of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (for 
example, in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice [1813], Aleksandr Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin 
[1832], Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Elective Affinities [1809]), materializes the 
emergence of the novelistic third person alongside the epistolary first person and allows 
stylistic exchange between the apparent psychological authority of the narrator and the 
seemingly innocent immediacy of the character’s verbalized experience (see also Bray 2003). 
Comparably to the case of Mme de Clèves and the letter, Pamela’s schematization of her own 
experience reflects an earlier moralistic commentary by the (occasional) authorial 
heterodiegetic narrator of Pamela: “And the Whole will shew the base Arts of designing Men 
to gain their wicked Ends; and how much it behoves the Fair Sex to stand upon their Guard 
against their artful Contrivances, especially when Riches and Power conspire against 
Innocence and a low Estate” (Richardson 2001 [1740]: 92). 
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What is more, the sentimental convention of the unique, hence inexpressible 
experience almost runs into its own impossibility in novels that also in other respects strain 
the verisimilitude of their communicative situations with loquacious character narrators 
endowed with implausibly good memories (diagnosed as “mnemonic overkill” by Cohn 
[1978: 162]). Abbé Prévost’s (1971 [1731]: 58) Manon Lescaut, to take yet another example 
from the sentimental tradition, presents the Chevalier de Grieux reminiscing over his reaction 
to yet another good-bye letter left behind by the wanton Manon, who has—again—found a 
better life with a well-to-do elderly gentleman: 
Je demeurai, après cette lecture, dans un état qui me serait difficile à décrire car 
j’ignore encore aujourd’hui par quelle espèce de sentiments je fus alors agité. Ce fut 
une de ces situations uniques auxquelles on n’a rien éprouvé qui soit semblable. On 
ne saurait les expliquer aux autres, parce qu’ils n’en ont pas l’idée; et l’on a peine à se 
les bien démêler à soi-même, parce qu’étant seules de leur espèce, cela ne se lie à rien 
dans la mémoire, et ne peut même être rapproché d’aucun sentiment connu. 
Cependant, de quelque nature que fussent les miens, il est certain qu’il devait y entrer 
de la douleur, du dépit, de la jalousie et de la honte. Heureux s’il n’y fût pas entré 
encore plus d’amour!12 
The experience of rejection leaves not only the experiencing but also the narrating de 
Grieux perplexed and ostensibly “wordless.” Paradoxically, the sentimental conventions for 
verbalizing unprecedented and inexpressible emotion develop into a ready-made schematic 
apparatus for consciousness representation in both homodiegetic and heterodiegetic 
narration—an apparatus, moreover, that is just as available to the characters inside the story 
world as it is to novelistic narrators trying to fabricate idiosyncratic fictional minds and 
experiences. The fact that the fictional mind is a product of language and nothing more finds 
its somewhat pathetic expression in de Grieux’s list of extreme emotions (“la douleur, du 
dépit, de la jalousie et de la honte”). This novelistic condition—the ultimate discrepancy 
between language and experience—was to find  its well-known pathological culmination in 
Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1999 [1857]: 97): “Et Emma cherchait à savoir ce que 
l’on entendait au juste dans la vie par les mots de félicité, de passion et d’ivresse, qui lui 
avaient paru si beaux dans les livres.”13 
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Conclusion and an Attempt at Synchronization 
A narratological analysis of the anxiety of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century characters in 
their quests for internalized, idiosyncratic language reveals to the twenty-first century reader 
the ultimate conventionality of our modernist reading practices attuned to individuating 
emotions and experiences. Yet the typicality model, foregrounded by the early psychological 
and sentimental novel, can be argued to still function in the production and interpretation of 
novels alongside the fidelity model, just as Fludernik maintains is happening when an 
embedded vocal position occurs in language use. Although Fludernik’s theory of 
schematization and typification shares the same cognitive-theoretical principles of 
prototypicality and frame application as subsequent cognitive-narratological theories that 
contest the exceptionality thesis, the argument I have developed in this essay does not lend 
unequivocal support to Herman’s accessibility and mediation arguments. It seems that the 
narratological scholarship on literary minds, when discussing the force of literary 
conventions, recognizes only the fidelity model, which, as such, can be too easy a target of 
cognitive approaches. 
To my mind, the most astute critical response to Herman’s mediation argument is 
made by Stefan Iversen (2013: 147), who, while expressing his approval for the accessibility 
argument and its foundation in contemporary anti-Cartesian philosophy of mind, remarks on 
the different phenomenologies of social interaction and the reading of fictional minds: “Real 
life offers [actual] persons but metaphorical readings, while written texts offer literal readings 
but no actual persons.” Iversen rightly points out that Herman’s logic of argumentation self-
contradictorily foregrounds both the immediate ease with which we construct thoughts and 
intentions for other people in everyday exchange (accessibility) and the similarity of our 
interpretative efforts (mediation) to make sense of literary and actual people alike. If inferring 
real minds is usually as effortless and automatized as contemporary philosophy of mind 
claims it is (e.g., Hutto 2008), how apt is the metaphor of “mind reading” after all? The 
mechanisms of schematic consciousness representation analyzed in this essay have their roots 
in universal cognitive principles but take shape inseparably from the textual, narrative, and 
thematic conventions of producing and reading literature. 
Furthermore, Iversen’s remark on the artificiality of agency (“no actual persons”) ties 
in with the problem of the “empty center” or the “missing original” in the theory of schematic 
language representation, a linguistic metaphor that finds its material, ontological, and 
epistemological manifestation in fiction. The phase of the early psychological and 
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sentimental novel with its amateurish narrators and inexpressible and unprecedented feelings 
and the simultaneous copying of and resistance to moral exempla passed, but the problem of 
the missing original experience or mental “utterance” remains at the heart of all literary 
representations of consciousness and experience. La Princesse de Clèves and all the other 
novels discussed in this essay display cultural and narrative generators of experientiality at 
work around this empty center. This generator consists of the courtly social maxims and 
exempla, the sentimental and self-fashioning register of letter writing, and the new, modern 
pull toward novelistic invention. A diachronic emphasis on the lack of original “raw feels” or 
qualia (as Herman [see, e.g., 2009: 152–53] and other cognitive narratologists would put it) 
in consciousness representation effectively challenges any straightforward distinction 
between naturally occurring and invented minds. Yet the dialogic relation between the mental 
history of Western culture and the diachronies of literary form is—and has to be—a complex 
object of analysis, and it should not be reduced to a mere mirror relation. After all, precisely 
the discrepancy between literary models and real life became the hallmark theme of many 
realist and modernist novels in the wake of Lafayette, Richardson, Prévost, Goethe, and 
Austen, a theme that generated ever more singular fictional minds struggling to overcome 
emotional and experiential clichés. 
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1. “Agitated and afflicted, as one can imagine: he thought everything that was natural to think 
in such circumstances; all he could think of was murdering his wife” (Lafayette 2008: 203). 
2. “It is difficult to imagine the thoughts that came into his mind at that moment. The violent 
state he was in would have led anyone who had been present to believe that he had lost his 
reason or was about to die. Jealousy and well-founded suspicions ordinarily prepare husbands 
for their misfortunes; it may even be that they always have their doubts; yet they are spared 
the certainty afforded by an open confession, which it is beyond our capacity to comprehend” 
(Lafayette 2008: 203). 
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3. As several studies on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century heterodiegetic narrators attest, 
there is of course no straightforward diachronic trajectory from unknowing to all-knowing 
narrators. See, e.g., Kukkonen 2014; Lanser 1992; Nelles 2006; Nünning 2012. Strategic 
limitations in narratorial “omniscience” continue to be an important compositional and 
rhetorical means in contemporary fiction as well. See Dawson 2013. 
4. “The ball began and, as she was dancing with M. de Guise, there was a loud noise over by 
the door of the ballroom as of people giving way to someone coming in. Mme de Clèves 
finished dancing, and while she was looking round to find someone she intended to take as a 
partner, the King called to her to take the person who had just arrived. She turned and saw a 
man she felt at once could be no other than M. de Nemours stepping over a chair to make his 
way to where the dancing was. He had such presence that it was difficult not to be taken 
aback on seeing him when one had never seen him before, especially that evening, when the 
care he had taken to dress elegantly added still more lustre to his appearance; but it was also 
difficult to see Mme de Clèves for the first time without being amazed” (Lafayette 2008: 23; 
my emphasis). 
5. “The Chevalier de Guise, who still worshipped her, was at her feet, and what had just taken 
place caused him the sharpest pain. He took it as an omen that fate meant M. de Nemours to 
fall in love with Mme de Clèves. Whether her face had really betrayed some inner turmoil or 
whether jealousy had caused the Chevalier de Guise to see more than was there, he believed 
that she had been affected by the sight of the prince” (Lafayette 2008: 24). 
6. See also Iversen 2013 for a similar critique of Herman’s mediation argument{au: Please 
provide a citation. Not needed anymore, citation provided in the body text} and the 
unproblematic pairing of mind reading and the reading of a text. 
7. “There could be no other story like mine in the world, no other woman capable of doing 
such a thing! Chance cannot have made someone invent it; no one has ever imagined it, the 
thought has never come into anyone’s head but mine” (Lafayette 2008: 110). 
8. “How could she not recognize herself as the person whose name no one knew? How could 
she fail to be overwhelmed with gratitude and tenderness on learning, by a route which could 
not be suspect to her, that M. de{au: Correct, as elsewhere? That’s right} Nemours, who 
had already touched her heart, was hiding his passion from all the world and neglecting the 
prospect of a crown because he loved her? Thus it is impossible to describe what she felt, the 
confusion that arose in her soul. If Mme La Dauphine had looked at her carefully, she would 
easily have perceived that the things she had just said were not indifferent to her; but, as she 
had not the least suspicion of the truth, she went on talking without giving the matter any 
thought” (Lafayette 2008: 53). 
9. I present a parallel analysis of this passage in “Masters of Interiority: Figural Voices as 
Discursive Appropriators and as Loopholes in Narrative Communication” (Mäkelä 2011) to 
demonstrate how the rhetorical intention and artfulness of epistolary self-expression translate 
into modern heterodiegetic narration through the expressivity markers of free indirect 
discourse. 
10. “Mme de Clèves read and reread this letter several times without, however, understanding 
it at all. She only saw that M. de Nemours was not in love with her as she had thought and 
that he loved other women whom he deceived as he was deceiving her. For a person of her 
temperament, who was in the grip of a violent passion, who had just betrayed signs of it to a 
man she judged unworthy of being loved and to another whom she was ill-treating for his 
sake—for such a person, to see and to know such things was terrible indeed. Never has pain 
been so piercing and sharp. . . . Her mind fastened to everything, in fact, that could possibly 
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increase her distress and despair. How severely she judged herself, how painfully she recalled 
her mother’s advice! How she repented of her failure to insist on removing herself from 
society. . . . She became convinced, in short, that all the evils that might be driven were as 
nothing compared to the fact that she had allowed M. de Nemours to see she loved him, and 
to the knowledge that he loved another woman. Her only consolation was to reflect that, now 
she knew the truth, she at least had nothing else to fear from her own feelings, and that she 
would be wholly cured of her inclination for Nemours” (Lafayette 2008: 72–73; my 
emphasis). 
11. “Nothing can match the pain I have endured. I believed you were violently in love with 
me; I ceased to hide my own passion from you, and then, at the very moment when I revealed 
it without reserve, I learnt that you were deceiving me, that you were in love with another 
woman, and that, to all appearances, you were sacrificing me to your new mistress. . . . The 
only way to rekindle your feelings for me, I thought, would be to make you see that my own 
had changed, while at the same time pretending to conceal the fact from you, as if I lacked 
the courage to confess it. I determined upon this course of action; but how difficult it was for 
me to adopt, and, when I saw you again, how impossible it seemed to carry through!” 
(Lafayette 2008: 70–71; my emphasis). 
12. “After reading this letter I was in a state of mind it is not easy to describe, for I do not 
know, even today, what the feelings were that caused me such agitation. It was one of those 
unique situations, the like of which one has never before experienced. You cannot explain 
them to others, because they can have no idea of them; and you can hardly fathom them 
yourself because, being the only ones of their kind, they correspond to nothing in your 
memory, and cannot even be compared with any other feeling you have known. And yet, 
whatever the precise nature of mine, it is certain that grief, resentment, jealousy, and shame 
all played their part. If only the greatest part of all had not been played by love!” (Prévost 
2004: 47–48). 
13. Emma sets out to “find out exactly what was meant in real life by the words felicity, 
passion and rapture, which had seemed so fine on the pages of the books” (Flaubert 2003: 
33). 
